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LEGISLATIVE QUALITY AND THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Writing in The Scotsman in July 2016, Alistair Bonnington made the startling claim that the Scottish 
WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƐ “ƚŚĞůŽǁĞƐƚƋƵĂůŝƚǇůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ ? ?1  Such hyperbole is easy to dismiss; 
given the linguistic challenges, and the varying roles and styles of legislation in different legal 
systems, how would one even begin to make such a comparative assessment?  Nevertheless, 
ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶƚƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƌŝŐŽƵƌŽĨ,ŽůǇƌŽŽĚ ?ƐůĞŐŝƐlative process and the quality of its legislative output, 
usually by comparison with Westminster, have dogged the Parliament since its earliest days, though 
criticisms are more often based on assertion and anecdote than detailed analysis.  This is perhaps 
unsurprising given that measuring the quality of legislation and the effectiveness of parliamentary 
scrutiny are more complex tasks than might be thought.2  This note aims to shed some light on the 
debate by considering the different things we might mean when talking ĂďŽƵƚ  “ŐŽŽĚ ? Žƌ  “ďĂĚ ?
legislation and by identifying what we know  W and, more importantly, what we do not know  W about 
Holyrood ?ƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ measured against these criteria. 
B. SUBSTANTIVE QUALITY 
Complaints about poor quality legislation often concern the substantive merits of particular Acts.  
Critics may believe that the aims are objectionable, the methods chosen to achieve those aims are 
misguided, or the policy could have been implemented without requiring new legislation.  Such 
judgments are necessarily subjective, and the ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ,ŽůǇƌŽŽĚ ?Ɛ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ŽƵƚƉƵƚ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ be 
condemned merely because some disagree with it.  However, more meaningful assessments of 
substantive quality can be made in terms of democratic legitimacy and policy effectiveness.  In other 
words, is Holyrood legislation responsive to the needs and wishes of people in Scotland, and does it 
achieve its aims without creating unanticipated problems? 
(1) Democratic Legitimacy 
A  W perhaps the  W key function of a Westminster-style parliament is to confer democratic legitimacy 
on legislative proposals.3  Since the legislative initiative in such systems rests primarily with the 
ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ? ƚŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŝƐ  “ƚŽ ƚƵƌŶ ƐŽŵething politically 
ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽƵƐ ŝŶƚŽ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƚƚƌĂĐƚƐ ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ ƉƵďůŝĐ ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ĂĚŚĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ?4  Given 
,ŽůǇƌŽŽĚ ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƌŝƚǇ ?5 it cannot plausibly be argued that it does not do this successfully6  W certainly 
much better than the situation before devolution.  The lack of time for Scottish legislation at 
Westminster, and the perceived democratic deficit arising from divergent electoral majorities at 
                                                          
1  “KŶĞWĂƌƚǇ^ƚĂƚĞŝƐƚŚĞŶĞŵǇŽĨĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?The Scotsman, 21 July 2016.   
2 ^ĞĞ^ŝƌ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶ>ĂǁƐ ? “tŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ^ĐƌƵƚŝŶǇŽĨ>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ&Žƌ ? ? ?ŝŶ,ŽƌŶĞĂŶĚ>Ğ^ƵĞƵƌ
(eds), Parliament Legislation and Accountability (Hart Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 2016) 16  W 17.  
3 Ibid, at 27. 
4 Ibid. 
5 See ScotCen, Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2015, Attitudes to the Role of the Scottish Parliament: Data 
Tables (2016), available at: http://www.ssa.natcen.ac.uk/media/38893/ssa15-tables-for-web.pdf.  
6 See, eg, Commission on Scottish Devolution, Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 
21st Century  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?:DŝƚĐŚĞůů ? “dŚĞEĂƌĐŝƐƐŝƐŵŽĨ^ŵĂůůŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ P^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚĂŶĚtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Parliamentary Affairs  ? ?Ăƚ ? ? ? ?WĂŝƌŶĞǇĂŶĚ::ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ? “tŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞZŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ?
(2013/14) 1 Scottish Parliamentary Review 91 at 130. 
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Scottish and UK levels were both key arguments for devolution.  The mere existence of the 
Parliament, along with its more proportional electoral system, means that it is much more 
democratically responsive, passing far more, and more timely legislation, better tailored to Scottish 
circumstances and political priorities  
Of course, the process is not perfect.  AƐŝŶĂŶǇtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?,ŽůǇƌŽŽĚ ?Ɛ legislative process is 
highly executive-dominated.  Aspirations  W perhaps naïve  W for greater power-sharing between the 
Parliament and executive than at Westminster7 have not been realised.8  But there is far more 
extensive public engagement in the legislative process through the committee system, particularly at 
Stage 1,9 even if more could be done to encourage wider participation, and at later stages.10  
Committees are often criticised for lack of political independence.11  But suggestions that Holyrood 
needs a second chamber to bring a degree of independent scrutiny to the legislative process12 have 
their own problems.  An unelected second chamber would undermine the democratic legitimacy of 
Scottish legislation, whereas an elected second chamber would be less independent of party politics 
and it is unclear what democratic value it would add.   
(2) Policy Effectiveness 
Legislation may be democratically legitimate, yet poor quality because it proves to be ineffective.  A 
second aim of the legislative process is therefore to scrutinise the policies embodied in legislation 
and amend them where necessary. 
There has been no comprehensive analysis of the extent to which the Scottish Parliament influences 
the content of legislation.  While there are greater opportunities than at Westminster for MSPs, and 
also Committees, to propose legislation, Scottish Government business dominates proceedings,13 
and it rarely suffers defeats.  Although formal defeats are a poor measure of parliamentary 
influence,14 and parliamentary pressure clearly does sometimes make a difference, it nevertheless 
ƐĞĞŵƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŚĂƚ,ŽůǇƌŽŽĚ ?s policy influence is relatively limited.  Parliamentary involvement comes 
late in the policy-making process, only once a Bill has been introduced.  There is no regular pre-
legislative scrutiny of draft Bills.  Nor is there any systematic post-legislative scrutiny to assess 
whether legislative aims are being met.   
                                                          
7 See B Crick and D Miller, To Make the Parliament of Scotland a Model for Democracy (John Wheatley Centre, 
1995); Consultative Steering Group, ^ŚĂƉŝŶŐ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ (Scottish Office, 1998). 
8 On the essential similarity of the Scottish and UK Parliaments, see Mitchell, above n6; Cairney and Johnston, 
above n6. 
9 ^ĞĞ::ŽŚŶƐƚŽŶ ? “dŚĞ>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞWƌŽĐĞƐƐ PƚŚĞWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚŝ WƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?ŝŶ:ĞĨĨĞƌǇĂŶĚ:DŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ĞĚƐ ? ?The 
Scottish Parliament 1999  ? 2009: the First Decade (Hansard Society/Luath Press Ltd, Edinburgh, 2009). 
10 See Cairney and Johnston, above n6, at 113  W 5; Scottish Parliament Standards, Procedures and Public 
Appointments Committee (SPPAC), Legislation and the Scottish Parliament, 3rd Report 2015 (Session 4) SP 
Paper 697. 
11 ^ĞĞĂƌŵĂŶĂŶĚD^ŚĞƉŚĂƌĚ ? “ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ?ŝŶ Jeffery and Mitchell, above n9; 
Cairney and Johnston, above n6, at 118  W 119.  
12 ^ĞĞ>ŽƌĚ,ŽƉĞŽĨƌĂŝŐŚĞĂĚ ? “tŚĂƚĂ^ĞĐŽŶĚŚĂŵďĞƌĂŶŽĨŽƌ>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ^ĐƌƵƚŝŶǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Stat LR 3; 
,>DĂĐYƵĞĞŶ ? “^ĞĐŽŶĚŚĂŵďĞƌĨŽƌƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ? ?ĂǀŝĚ,ƵŵĞ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ?ZĞǀŝƐĞĚĞĚŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
13 A Page, Constitutional Law of Scotland (W Green & Son, Edinburgh, 2015) paras 13.02, 13.29 -13.32. 
14 ^ĞĞ'ŽǀĞƌĂŶĚDZƵƐƐĞůů ? “WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ PWĞƌŚĂƉƐtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌŝƐDŽƌĞWŽǁĞƌĨƵůdŚĂŶzŽƵ





One apparent problem is the small size of the Parliament.  Committees are seen as being over-
burdened  W something likely to be exacerbated by ,ŽůǇƌŽŽĚ ?Ɛrecently increased responsibilities.  
The legislative process is also sometimes perceived to be rushed; although in theory, the Parliament 
has the whole four/five yearly session in which to enact legislation, there is a political imperative to 
complete the process within an annual cycle.15  And there have been persistent problems with 
turnover of committee members, reducing their ability to develop policy expertise.16  Steps have 
been taken to try to address some of these issues.17  However, Cairney suggests that they are 
endemic to a Westminster-style legislature, in which there is an inevitable imbalance in the 
resources available to government to produce policy and to the Parliament to scrutinise it.18  
Despite these weaknesses, there is no evidence of systemic legislative failure.  The most 
ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƐƚƵĚǇŽĨ,ŽůǇƌŽŽĚ ?Ɛ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞŽƵƚƉƵƚ ƚŽĚĂƚĞƉĂŝŶƚĞĚĂƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůǇŵŝǆĞĚƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ?
with greater perceived success in some areas than others.19  An equivalent ƌĞǀŝĞǁŽĨtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ?Ɛ
legislative output would almost certainly produce a similar level of criticism.20  Indeed, the House of 
Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in a 2013 report noted repeated criticisms 
about the quality of legislation, and that witnesses had been unanimous in calling for improved 
legislative standards.21  Moreover, where there have been policy failures (and those failures were 
predictable or avoidable), it is difficult to know how much of the blame should be placed on the 
Parliament.22  Since determining legislative policy is primarily a matter for government, conducted in 
consultation with policy networks, legislative failures may indicate weaknesses in policy capacity (in 
government and/or civil society) rather than in the legislative process.  Alternatively, problems my 
lie not with the legislation itself, but instead with its implementation  W lack of funding, inadequate 
training, IT problems, etc. 
C. CONSTITUTIONAL QUALITY 
As a legally-limited legislature, what might be termed  “ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ? ŝƐa particularly 
important issue for the Scottish Parliament.  Acts of the Scottish Parliament (ASPs) which breach the 
limits in section 29 of the Scotland Act 1998  W most significantly, if they relate to reserved matters or 
are incompatible with Convention rights or European Union law  W ĂƌĞ “ŶŽƚůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚƌŝƐŬ being struck 
down by the courts.  Express vires constraints do not exhaust considerations of constitutional 
quality, however.  There may also be concerns about legislation which, for instance, contains 
excessive delegations of legislative power, has retrospective effects, interferes with the separation 
of powers, and so on.23  Breach of constitutional standards does not necessarily make legislation bad 
                                                          
15 Page, above n13, at paras 13.07  W 13.09.   
16 See Carman and Shepherd, above n11. 
17 The SPPAC has issued several recent reports recommending improvements in legislative and committee 
procedures  W Post-Legislative Scrutiny, 8th Report 2013 (Session 4), SP Paper 410; Legislation and the Scottish 
Parliament, above n9; Committee Reform, 1st Report 2016 (Session 4), SP Paper 882. 
18 SPPAC, above n11, annexe C. 
19 E Sutherland et al (eds), Law-Making and the Scottish Parliament: the Early Years (Edinburgh University 
Press, 2011).  
20 For a depressing litany of UK Government policy failures, see A King and I Crewe, The Blunders of Our 
Governments (One World Publications, 2013).    
21 Ensuring Standards in the Quality of Legislation, 1st Report 2013  W 14, HC 85, 5, 7.   
22 Cf Laws, above n2, at 7. 
23 See J Simson Caird, R Hazell and D Oliver, The Constitutional Standards of the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Constitution (The Constitution Unit, 2nd edn, 2015). 
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in a substantive sense.  An ASP which is,say, ultra vires for encroaching on reserved matters may be 
unobjectionable if enacted by Westminster.  In other cases, though, assessments of constitutional 
quality shade into assessments of substantive merits and may be equally contestable.   
In recent years, the UK Parliament has become more concerned with policing the constitutional 
quality of legislation, via the House of >ŽƌĚƐ ? ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ and Delegated Powers and 
Regulatory Reform Committee, and the Joint Committee on Human Rights.24  In the Scottish 
Parliament, the Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee examines proposed delegated 
powers, but there is no committee specifically charged with assessing the vires of Bills, nor 
compliance with broader constitutional standards.25  Instead, Holyrood relies on the statutory 
machinery of ministerial/Presiding Officer statements as to competence ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ >Ăǁ KĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ?
powers to refer Bills to the Supreme Court26 to ensure scrutiny of constitutional quality  W a process 
which is narrowly focused on questions of vires, and is conducted almost entirely by negotiation 
behind closed doors,27 with MSPs being given little information on which they might form their own 
conclusions.28   
That said, the system appears to work effectively.  There have only ever been three successful 
competence challenges to ASPs, all on human rights grounds.29  By comparison,30 nine UK statutes 
enacted since 1999 have been declared incompatible with Convention rights.31  This is, however, 
only a partial indicator of constitutional quality.  No figures are available on how often judges have 
given legislation a strained interpretation32 in order to avoiding condemning it.  Nor is it possible to 
determine whether potential challenges have been missed.  Similarly, as far as wider measures of 
constitutional quality are concerned, no systematic evaluation of Scottish legislation has yet been 
conducted.33 
D. TECHNICAL QUALITY 
A final set of criteria relates to the technical quality of legislation.  According to the UK Parliamentary 
Counsel, good law should be: necessary; clear; coherent; effective; and accessible.34  Assessing the 
technical quality of legislation may appear to involve the least contentious judgments, but in reality 
                                                          
24 See J Simson CairĚĂŶĚKůŝǀĞƌ ? “WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ? ?ŝŶ,ŽƌŶĞĂŶĚ>Ğ^ƵĞƵƌ ?ĂďŽǀĞŶ ? ? 
25 Responsibility for the constitution has recently ďĞĞŶĂĚĚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ&ŝŶĂŶĐĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐƌĞŵŝƚ ?ďƵƚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚ
yet clear how this will be discharged. 
26 Scotland Act 1998, ss 31 and 33. 
27 ^ĞĞWĂŐĞ ? “WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŝƐŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ?dŚĞ>Ăǁ-DĂŬŝŶŐWƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ?ŝŶ
Sutherland et al, above n19, at 20  W 22, 28  W 30.  
28 No reasons are required for competence statements, except where the Presiding Officer considers that a Bill 
is ultra vires  W Standing Orders of the Scottish Parliament (5th edn, revision 1, 2016) Rule 9.3(1)(b). 
29 Cameron v Cottam 2012 SLT 173 (Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, s 58); Salvesen v Riddell 
[2013] UKSC 32 (Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003, s 72); Christian Institute v Lord Advocate [2016] 
UKSC 51 (Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 2014, Pt 4). 
30 The comparison is not direct, given Westminster ?Ɛďroader legislative responsibilities than Holyrood.  
31 Human Rights Act 1998, s 4. 
32 Scotland Act 1998, s101; Human Rights Act 1998, s3. 
33 ƵƚƐĞĞK ?EĞŝůů ? “,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚWĞŽƉůĞĂŶĚ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?ŝŶ^ƵƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚet al, above n19, for criticism of 
,ŽůǇƌŽŽĚ ?ƐƌĞĐŽƌĚŝŶƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?
34 Office of Parliamentary Counsel, Good Law Initiative, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/good-law.  
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some technical desiderata may be in tension with others, and legislation also has to serve different 
audiences (politicians, lawyers and judges, the public) with varying requirements.35 
The Scottish Parliament has faced significant criticism of its performance as a technical scrutineer of 
legislation.  MSPs are alleged to lack interest in, and aptitude for, the task.36  There are also fewer 
legislative stages than at Westminster, meaning that late amendments may not be properly 
scrutinised.37  To address the latter problem, recommendations have been made to move from a 
three-stage to a four-stage legislative process (splitting the last amendment stage and final approval 
of the Bill), as well as to increase minimum periods between stages and require earlier notification of 
amendments.38  Again, though, some argue that effective technical scrutiny requires a second 
chamber,39 or at least by review by an independent panel of experts.40   
Others, however, contend that it is not the WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ function to ensure the technical quality of 
legislation; rather the primary responsibility lies with government and drafters.41  The Scottish 
Parliamentary Counsel undoubtedly take that responsibility seriously.42  In fact, some criticisms of 
the technical quality of ASPs may be a reaction to deliberate differences in their drafting style 
compared with UK legislation.43  While particular instances of poor drafting can nevertheless be 
identified, it is once again unclear whether the error rate is greater than can reasonably be expected 
given the inherent difficulties involved in legislative drafting, or any greater than for UK statutes.   
E. CONCLUSION 
There are multiple criteria by which to judge good and bad legislation.  While there may be cause for 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ĂďŽƵƚ ,ŽůǇƌŽŽĚ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚsome of those criteria, we lack robust evidence 
about how well it discharges its legislative functions and, crucially, about how this affects the quality 
of its legislative output.  It is clearly appropriate to seek to improve the legislative process where 
possible, but it is also important to be realistic about the standard to be reached, and about the 
WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽŝƚƐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?WĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŶŽƚĂƚƚĂŝŶĂďůe; and parliaments play only 
a limited part in the production of legislation.  Accordingly, the case that Holyrood is a poor legislator 
is  W for now at least  W at best, not proven. 
Aileen McHarg 
University of Strathclyde 
                                                          
35 Cf Laws, above n2, at 30. 
36 Hope, above n12, at 8; -0F&OXVNLH³1HZ$SSURDFKHVWR8./HJLVODWLYH'UDIWLQJWKH9LHZIURP
6FRWODQG´6WDW/5DW 
37 Calman, above n6, at 224- 6; SPPAC, above n10, at 14  W 24. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Hope, above n12; MacQueen, above n12. 
40 Lord Steel ŽĨŝŬǁŽŽĚ ? “ŽǌĞŶŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŽĨĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶ:ĞĨĨĞƌǇĂŶĚDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?ĂďŽǀĞŶ ? ?Ăƚ ? ? W 21.  
41 Laws, above n2, at 36; Cairney, above n18. 
42 See Parliamentary Counsel Office¸ Drafting Matters! (Scottish Government, 2016). 
43 See McCluskie, above n36. 
